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ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge 
are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only 
virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we 
argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome 
these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding 
how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of 
being true. The Secondary Value is a problem of understanding how, for instance, property of being 
knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being jointly true and 
justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are ongoing states reveals that there is no 
difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere 
true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge 
might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic 
suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good 
of truth.
Keywords: knowledge; epistemic value; Swamping Problem; virtue epistemology  
Many have been attracted to the position that justified true belief is good 
enough for many purposes. If I have a justified true belief about where the beer 
is, how to cure AIDS, or my not being a brain in a vat, who cares whether or 
not I have knowledge? This is why  some view the Gettier industry with 
bemusement. [Jackson 2002: 516]
...the only way  to capture our intuition that knowledge is distinctively valuable 
is by  demonstrating that it is finally valuable. Unfortunately, we have found 
that the only prima facie plausible account of why knowledge might be finally 
valuable—that offered by robust virtue epistemology—does not stand up to 
closer scrutiny. [Pritchard 2009a: 15]
Truth plus a reliable source of truth cannot explain the value of knowledge. It 
follows that there must be a value in the cause of a true belief that is 
independent of reliability or truth conduciveness....  [Zagzebski 2003: 14]
1. Introduction
 That knowledge must be more epistemically valuable (henceforth ‘e-valuable’) than mere 
true belief is often assumed to generate an ex ante constraint on candidate theories of knowledge: 
the conditions that a theory places on knowledge (beyond true belief) must be such that a true belief 
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that satisfies those conditions must be ordinarily more e-valuable than one that does not [Kvanvig 
2003; Pritchard 2009b; Greco 2009; Kvanvig 2010].1 (Epistemic value is, presumably, value arising 
from the existence of distinctively intellectual goods as opposed to, for instance, the presence of 
pleasure.)2 The Primary Value Problem is the problem of developing a theory capable of 
accommodating this (plausible-seeming) constraint.3 The main obstacle to developing such a theory 
is generally assumed to be the Swamping Problem—the problem of addressing the question of how 
the property of knowledge could add any e-value to an already true belief.4 This challenge has been 
highlighted by Kvanvig [2003, 2010], Zagzebski [2003], Jones [1997], Pritchard [2009b], and 
Swinburne [1999].
 The Primary Value Problem can be understood as a special case of a more general problem. 
Call a property, C, a component of knowledge if and only if, necessarily, a belief that is knowledge 
has C, but possibly, a belief that has C is not knowledge. Thus, beliefs that have component 
properties may fall short of knowledge, but such properties are necessary for knowledge. That 
knowledge must be more e-valuable than any component of knowledge seems plausible, and so a 
more general ex ante constraint arises: for any component of knowledge, C, a belief that is 
knowledge must ordinarily turn out to be more e-valuable than a belief that has C, but is not 
knowledge. Any theory capable of accommodating this constraint will obviously guarantee that 
knowledge is ordinarily more e-valuable than true belief, but it will also guarantee that knowledge 
is ordinarily more e-valuable than, for instance, justified true belief that falls short of knowledge. 
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1 Cf. Baehr [2009] and Ridge [2011] for recent challenges to this assumption.
2 For our purposes, it doesn’t matter whether we can make sense of distinctively epistemic value because our main point 
is just that constraints driven by considerations of epistemic value, if there are any, are relatively easy to accommodate.   
3 Here, we adopt Pritchard’s [2009a] terminology. This problem is sometimes referred to as the Meno Problem. Indeed, 
Kvanvig [2003] suggests that, while the Meno exchange concerns pragmatic value, the ‘moral’ of the exchange 
concerns epistemic value.
4 Sometimes the Swamping Problem is identified with the Primary Value Problem. However, we agree with Pritchard 
[2009a] that the Swamping Problem is a problem of demonstrating that it is possible to develop a theory of knowledge 
such that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief; the Primary Value Problem is a problem of actually 
developing such a theory.
Call the problem of developing a theory capable of accommodating this constraint the Secondary 
Value Problem.5
 These problems are generally articulated in terms of e-value, so our discussion of the 
problems will follow suit. However, analogous challenges can be levied in terms of pragmatic value
—that is to say, value related to the more general well-being of believers.6 True belief appears to 
have pragmatic value in certain canonical circumstances, given that acting upon true beliefs suffices 
for satisfying desires. One might worry that this pragmatic value leaves little room for additional 
value in central cases of knowledge.
 For many epistemologists, the challenge of addressing these problems has seemed vexing; 
Kvanvig [2003], for example, is inclined to conclude that it cannot be met. Others have suggested 
that while these constraints can ultimately be accommodated, the class of theories with the requisite 
resources is restrictive—perhaps including only virtue theories on which knowledge is roughly 
understood as a belief that is true because of the manifestation of particular cognitive abilities. Such 
theorists conclude that knowledge is finally valuable because cognitive achievements—i.e., 
successes creditable to cognitive ability—are finally valuable and knowledge is such a cognitive 
achievement [Zagzebski 2003; Sosa 2007; Greco 2010].
 By contrast, we argue that, insofar as they are problems at all, these problems can be 
resolved straightforwardly. Moreover, we suggest that the ex ante constraints of the Primary and 
Secondary Value Problem can be met on theories of knowledge where knowledge is understood as 
justified true belief that meets some other (difficult or even impossible to specify) condition aimed 
at blocking Gettier cases (henceforth ‘JTB+ theories’)— a plethora of theories, if not the majority 
of them.
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5 Again, we borrow this terminology from Pritchard [2009a]. For Prichard, however, the problem is one of explaining 
how knowledge could be more valuable than any proper subset of its parts. We have recast the problem because we 
don’t want to assume that knowledge is divisible into parts.
6 For instance, Olsson’s [2007] principal argument focuses on this analogous challenge.
 In §2, we present a solution to the Swamping Problem and explain how this solution may be 
elaborated to develop a response to the Primary Value Problem accessible to JTB+ theorists. In §3, 
we expand upon the strategies advanced in §2 to address the Secondary Value Problem. In §4, we 
consider how our remarks bear on a further possible value problem before concluding in §5.
2. The Primary Value Problem
 The project of solving the Primary Value Problem would be clearly undermined if the 
Swamping Problem could not be overcome. For if the e-value conferred by knowledge were 
nothing beyond the e-value of true belief, developing a theory capable of meeting the relevant 
constraint would be straightforwardly impossible. In order to tackle the Primary Value Problem, 
then, one would have to clear the way by adequately responding to the Swamping Problem.
 The Swamping Problem is generated by the Swamping Argument. The Swamping Argument, 
as we shall characterize it, arises from three of four independently plausible premises:
(S1) Knowledge is more e-valuable than mere true belief. 
(S2) Any e-value conferred on a belief merely by that belief having some non-
factive property is instrumental value relative to the further epistemic good of 
true rather than false belief. 
(S3) If knowledge is more e-valuable than mere true belief, then there is a non-
factive component of knowledge that, in instances of knowledge, adds e-value. 
(S4) If the value of a property possessed by an item is only instrumental value 
relative to a further good and that good is already present in that item, then it 
can confer no additional value. [Pritchard, 2009b] 
 All these premises have intuitive appeal. The first, S1, is largely just an articulation of the ex 
ante constraint suggested by the Primary Value Problem. The second premise, S2, gives conditions 
under which a property is e-valuable. Clearly, there are many different kinds of value, e.g. 
pragmatic, aesthetic, etc. Arguably, what distinguishes epistemic value from value of these other 
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sorts is some connection to the fundamental good of true rather than false belief.7 One might think it 
is something like S2 that explains the e-value of justification—justified beliefs are more e-valuable 
than (e-disvaluable) unjustified beliefs precisely because justified beliefs are more likely to be true, 
or, alternatively, true in the default case, whereas unjustified beliefs are less likely to be true and 
may even be false in the default case. S3 is an ostensible precondition for the truth of S1. Unless 
there is some non-factive component of knowledge that, in instances of knowledge, adds e-value, 
knowledge cannot be more e-valuable than mere true belief.
 The final condition, S4, we may call the Swamping Thesis (following Pritchard [2009b]). 
The Swamping Thesis is typically motivated by way of analogy. Suppose you are presented with 
two identical cups of coffee; both are equally large and delicious [Zagzebski 2003; Pritchard 
2009b]. One has been produced by a machine that reliably outputs excellent coffee. The other is a 
happy fluke—produced by a machine that ordinarily brews undrinkable sludge. Insofar as you are 
convinced that the cups of coffee are really identical, it seems that you will have no preference for 
one over the other. The fact that one cup was produced by an excellent machine confers no 
additional value on it. Thus, the value the property of having been produced by an excellent 
machine confers on the coffee is ‘swamped’ by the value conferred by the property of being a great 
cup of coffee. S4 simply generalizes this kind of reasoning to value of all sorts.
 Despite the individual appeal of S1-S4, they are not co-tenable. Let Ve be a function that 
inputs properties of a belief, and outputs the e-value contributed by those properties. Let K be the 
property of being knowledge, and T the property of being true. Let C be some arbitrary non-factive 
component of knowledge. We can reason as follows: 
(i) C adds only instrumental e-value relative to the further epistemic good of true 
rather than false belief. (by S2) 
(ii) Therefore, Ve(T&C) = Ve(T). (by S4) 
5
7 The suggestion that the fundamental epistemic good is true rather than false belief rather than merely true belief is not 
without significance. S2 encapsulates a plausible veritism whereby not only is true belief e-valuable, but false belief is 
e-disvaluable. 
(iii) Therefore, no non-factive component adds e-value in instances of K. (by 
Universal Generalization) 
(iv) Therefore, Ve(K) = Ve(T) (by S3) 
 The conclusion (iv) is the rejection of S1. A natural response to the Swamping Argument is 
to retain S1 by rejecting S2. (For instance, one might adopt the view that the fundamental good that 
distinguishes epistemic value is knowledge.) While there may be independent motivations to reject 
S2, we think that pursuing this approach is unnecessary for defending the value of knowledge 
because S4 is demonstrably unacceptable [Carter and Jarvis forthcoming].
 S4, as we note, is typically motivated by analogies like the coffee example discussed above. 
We consider a good: delicious coffee. We see that the value of the property of being produced by an 
excellent coffee maker is only instrumental relative to the good of delicious coffee. But then we see 
that once deliciousness is present in the coffee, having been produced by an excellent coffee maker 
confers no additional value. To understand what is wrong with S4, we may consider something else 
we value: having a pleasant home. Very plausibly, the value of the property of being well-
maintained is instrumental to the good of having a pleasant home. For instance, suppose Bertie’s 
flat is exceptionally pleasant; not only is it well-maintained, but it is tastefully decorated, 
conveniently located, etc. Is the value of being well-maintained ‘swamped’ by the value of the 
Bertie’s already pleasant flat? It seems not. 
 Here is why: the project of keeping up a home is rather unlike the project of making a cup of 
coffee. The project of producing a cup of coffee has a clear terminus. The instrumental value that 
the property of being produced by an excellent machine confers on the coffee can only be 
‘swamped’ when the process is over. To see this, imagine that you are watching a reliable coffee 
maker and an unreliable one brewing coffee side by side. If, during the process, you consider which 
machine’s output you’d prefer, it seems clear that you should choose the output of the reliable 
machine (even granting that the current brews in both machines are identical). The trouble is that, 
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so long as the coffee is brewing, the bad machine has a greater chance of ruining the mixture. So, 
the ‘swamping’ can only happen when the brewing is done. 
 Of course, the project of keeping up a pleasant home does not have a clear terminus. Once 
we appreciate this, it becomes clear that the property of being well-maintained cannot be 
‘swamped’ by the value of Bertie’s already pleasant flat; for if the flat is to continue to be pleasant, 
it will have to go on being well-maintained. Thus, although the value of property of being well-
maintained is instrumental to the good of having a pleasant home, the property of being well-
maintained can continue to confer instrumental value on the home indefinitely. This case presents a 
straightforward counterexample to S4, and, thus, defuses the Swamping Argument and the 
Swamping Problem it generates.
 Once this resolution of the Swamping Problem comes into view, a solution to the Primary 
Value Problem takes shape.8 By definition, JTB+ theories are committed to the thought that true 
beliefs that have the property of knowledge have the property of justification. The justification 
condition has been cashed out in a variety of ways, but, ostensibly, proponents of any account of 
justification would agree that (doxastically) justified beliefs are beliefs that are acquired and 
sustained under certain appropriate circumstances (the details of which can be filled in by the 
relevant theory). Plainly, the acquisition of a new belief is an event with a terminus. But beliefs 
themselves are ongoing states.9 They are not events with a clear terminus like the production of a 
cup of coffee [Williamson 2000: 35; Chrisman forthcoming]. Once we apprehend this, we can 
immediately see a route to accommodating the ex ante constraint posed by the Primary Value 
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8 Olsson [2007] responds similarly to the Swamping Problem: coffee and belief are disanalogous because the latter can 
be ‘destabilized’ whereas the former cannot. We think that distinction between events and states can explain this 
disanalogy. 
9 As Mourelatos [1978] points out, dynamic events with terminuses, such as accomplishments and activities, typically 
have progressive forms in English. However, neither ‘I am knowing p’, nor ‘I am believing p’ is felicitous. This 
observation is consistent with the Vendler-Kenney scheme [Vendler 1967] of verb types. As Chrisman [forthcoming: 8] 
notes, the unavailability of the progressive generally sufficient for testing whether a verb phrase is ‘non-dynamic’. 
Importantly, states are aspectually classified as (unlike what would admit of a terminus) non-dynamic. These 
considerations favour parting ways with the orthodoxy in the literature on epistemic value, according to which true 
beliefs are viewed (for the purpose of assessing epistemic value) as having some evaluable terminus.
Problem. For, in light of the fact that a true belief is an ongoing state, we can see that the (historical) 
property of having been acquired under appropriate circumstances might continue to confer 
instrumental e-value on a true belief even though the acquisition process has already reached its 
terminus. Consider that designing a home is also an event with a terminus. But even so, the 
(historical) property of having been cleverly designed clearly continues to confer instrumental value 
vis-à-vis having a pleasant home long after the design process has reached its terminus. 
Moreover, it is critical to stress that managing beliefs, much like maintaining a house is an 
ongoing affair. Managing a belief continues long after the belief has been acquired; we may reflect 
on beliefs, and, ultimately, discard them.10 Having a justified belief, presumably, is not just a matter 
of having a belief that has been acquired under appropriate circumstances; it is also a matter of 
sustaining that belief under the right conditions. Indeed, it is natural to think that acquiring a belief 
under the right circumstances is important, in part, because doing so facilitates sustaining a belief 
that is true, just as designing a house cleverly is important, in part, because doing so facilitates 
sustaining a house that is pleasant. 
This point is particularly salient for those who, following Leite [2004, 2010], contend that 
the ability to offer reasons for a belief is, in many central instances, constitutive of being justified in 
believing (for that reason). On such a proposal, justification—and any concomitant instrumental e-
value—is tied to the possibility of giving reasons for one’s present belief. It is not entirely 
implausible that, in certain instances, part of what is required to manage a belief well is having an 
ability to address potential challenges. If so, then properly managing a belief is plainly an ongoing 
affair.
However, even those who deny that the ability to offer reasons for a belief is necessary for 
one to remain justified in believing p still have good grounds to maintain both that (i) managing a 
justified belief well over time involves (at least in part) the ability to respond appropriately to 
8
10 Cf. Olsson [2007] who focuses narrowly on reliabilist theories of justification.
potential defeaters even if that belief’s acquiring its status as justified is largely a function of, say, 
satisfying externalist criteria at the time of acquisition; and (ii) responding (and having the ability to 
respond) appropriately to potential defeaters is not something that has to occur at the stage of 
acquisition of the belief. Rather, it typically takes place at least partly after the belief has been 
acquired. 
In any case, it is imminently plausible that a belief’s being justified over time is a matter of 
its being well-managed not only in terms of its acquisition but also its sustainment. Sustaining a 
belief under the right conditions also (continually) confers instrumental value on the belief just as 
keeping up a house (continually) confers instrumental value towards the end of having a pleasant 
home. 
As the default, good management of a pre-existing belief might involve retaining and not 
actively reconsidering the belief—but only assuming that the default is also that beliefs are 
felicitously acquired so as to start out justified. In general, dogmatically sustaining a belief does not 
facilitate the end of true rather than false belief per se, even if the belief in question happens to be 
true. Sustaining beliefs at random is no better in this respect. These approaches to managing pre-
existing beliefs do not select for having distinctively true beliefs any more than an approach of 
acquiring just any belief would. Consequently, neither approach confers any truth-related 
instrumental e-value. 
The right conditions for sustainment exclude not only (at least some) conditions in which 
the belief has been infelicitously acquired, but also (at least some) conditions in which acquisition 
was originally reasonable but would no longer be so—as when a subject discovers that her belief, if 
true, was Gettierized at the time of acquisition.11 We propose that a belief that both was acquired 
felicitously and is now sustained in a way that potentially is rationally responsive to forthcoming 
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11 In making a similar argument, Olsson [2007] focuses narrowly on conditions in which the belief has been acquired 
unreliably, i.e. in a way that is in at least one respect infelicitous, and this fact comes to light. However, defeaters that 
will destabilize the belief (assuming the subject is rational) need not reveal that the belief was acquired in a generally 
unreliable way.  
defeaters is a canonical instance of an instrumentally e-valuable belief. This belief is presently 
selected for being true rather than false even if this present selection is largely parasitic on the 
belief’s having been selected for being true rather than false during its acquisition. This belief is 
also very plausibly a canonical instance of a well-managed—and therefore, justified—belief, 
suggesting that being justified necessarily gives rise to instrumental e-value.12
 It is imperative also to emphasize that being ‘well-managed’ could be understood in a 
myriad of ways. Along with admitting of a virtue-theoretic reading, it could also be understood 
‘mechanistically’ as simply being acquired and sustained under causal influences that, when the 
world cooperates, result in truth. To see why, it is useful to return to our home analogy. The fact that 
Bertie’s flat is well-maintained (in the relevant sense) may not be clearly attributable to Bertie’s 
abilities. We might imagine that Bertie is utterly incompetent in such matters. The fact that his flat 
is well-maintained may be entirely the result of the efforts of his far more competent valet, Jeeves. 
And, although it is surely not the case with Jeeves, it is possible for a valet to maintain a flat well, 
but not for that reason; a valet might maintain a flat well because good maintenance is incidental to 
some other pursuit. Finally, even the fact that Bertie has in his employ a valet that properly 
maintains his flat need not be due to some special skill Bertie possesses; we might imagine that 
Bertie engaged the services of Jeeves in a drunken stupor. These possibilities illustrate that being 
well-maintained in the relevant sense need not have any implications about whether the flat is 
maintained responsibly or even in such a way that someone deserves credit for success. The same 
could be said for the good management of beliefs. What matters is simply that a good result is 
regularly delivered (whatever the explanation). Consequently, the claim that justified beliefs are 
well-managed beliefs cannot be especially controversial.  
10
12 Note that the kinds of ancillary contingent assumptions that Olsson [2007] makes in constructing his narrower 
argument for the value of justification understood as reliability can be dispensed with, assuming that one adopts a more 
plausible version of veritism that acknowledges the disvalue of false belief. See footnote 7. This point is significant as it 
shows that the links between justification and e-value are necessary rather than contingent. 
 In any case, once we observe that true beliefs are ongoing states, it seems overwhelmingly 
plausible that good management (in terms of its acquisition and sustainment) can confer 
instrumental e-value on a true belief indefinitely. Of course, if the property of knowledge confers 
the instrumental e-value of the property of being well-managed on a true belief (because it confers 
the instrumental e-value of the property of being justified on a true belief), then, ipso facto, the 
property of knowledge will confer instrumental e-value on that true belief indefinitely. 
 Accordingly, it seems palpable that JTB+ theories offer the resources to accommodate the ex 
ante constraint that a true belief that satisfies the conditions of knowledge must be more e-valuable 
than a true belief that does not. So much for the Primary Value Problem.
3. The Secondary Value Problem
 While the previous section may provide a satisfactory resolution to the Primary Value 
Problem, it may increase anxiety about the possibility of surmounting the Secondary Value 
Problem. Recall, the Secondary Value Problem is a problem of developing a theory of knowledge 
which accommodates the constraint that for any component of knowledge, C, a belief that is 
knowledge must ordinarily turn out to be more e-valuable than a belief that merely has C; it is a 
problem of developing a theory of knowledge on which the e-value of knowledge does not regularly  
collapse into the e-value of any component of knowledge. 
 Above, we argue that since true beliefs are ongoing states, the Primary Value Problem can 
be overcome. This is because true beliefs that have the property of knowledge also have the 
property of being justified, and the latter implies that the beliefs are well-managed in terms of their 
acquisition and sustainment. And it is easy to see how this latter property can continue to confer 
instrumental e-value on an ongoing true belief state. However, if knowledge confers more e-value 
on a belief than truth does because knowledge involves justification, then one might (reasonably) 
wonder whether the e-value of knowledge collapses into the e-value of justified true belief. To put 
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the point differently: if what we have said thus far is right, it is easy to see that satisfying both the 
‘J’ and the ‘T’ conditions of a JTB+ theory of knowledge could continually add e-value to an 
ongoing belief, but it might be difficult to see what value satisfying the ‘+’ condition could be 
adding. We contend that, despite any initial appearances to the contrary, it does add something. 
 To understand what kind of value could be added, consider (again) the good of having a 
pleasant home. What kinds of properties are instrumental to this good? We’ve already seen one kind 
of property is that of being well-maintained. Other examples spring to mind. Properties, like being 
cleverly designed, being tastefully decorated, being conveniently located, etc. are also instrumental. 
A notable feature of these properties is that a home comes to have them through the causal 
influence of home designers, constructors, and dwellers—or, more precisely, the causal influence of 
the psychological mechanisms of home designers, builders, and dwellers at a personal or 
subpersonal level (whether or not they reflect any kind of agency). Let’s call properties that arise 
from such causes ψ-properties.
 Now we might ask: if a home comes to have all the possible ψ-properties instrumental to the 
good of being pleasant, will it be pleasant? Not always. Bertie’s assiduously maintained, swanky 
Art Deco flat located in the most fashionable district of London could clearly be ravaged by a fluke 
hurricane. His tastefully decorated lounge would surely not be pleasant under several feet of water. 
This observation leads naturally to the conclusion that there are properties instrumental to the good 
of a pleasant home besides ψ-properties. These are properties of happy circumstance. To 
summarize, there are two distinct kinds of properties instrumental to the good of a pleasant house. 
There are ψ-properties. But, there are also properties that are the result of ambient causes. 
 It is worth emphasizing that the conferral of instrumental value on a home—both by ψ-
properties and by properties that result from ambient factors—results from an important sense in 
which these two kinds of properties complement one another to secure the good in canonical cases.  
Insofar as we can anticipate ambient factors that may come to bear on a home, we adjust our 
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methods of designing and maintaining that home to ensure that it will be pleasant when these 
factors come to bear. The methods that are effective in creating a pleasant home in California, 
where earthquakes are common, are different from those that are effective in creating a pleasant 
home in Colorado, where heavy snowfall is frequent. Thus, good methods in design, construction, 
and maintenance appear to be methods that are effective in securing the good of having a pleasant 
home in whatever kinds of circumstances can be taken as the default in the present case. 
Distinctively happy circumstances are, similarly, whatever circumstances facilitate securing the 
good of having a pleasant home when good methods in design, construction, and maintenance are 
undertaken. If these methods anticipate heavy snowfall, then heavy snowfall need not be especially 
unhappy. But, if they do not anticipate heavy snowfall—because it is exceptional—then, heavy 
snowfall may confer considerable instrumental disvalue. 
 We have already observed that, because a pleasant house is an ongoing state, ψ-properties 
can continue contributing instrumental value on an already pleasant home indefinitely. Now we 
must consider: can ambient factors likewise continue contributing instrumental value on an already 
pleasant home? It seems so. For, obviously, if the home is to go on being pleasant it will have to go 
on not being flooded by fluke hurricanes, etc. It seems equally clear that a (historical) property like 
having been built in weather conditions that facilitate construction (i.e., having been built in 
conditions where no precipitation occurred until after the structure was weathertight) —which, 
because of the unpredictability of weather patterns, could only partly be due to the causal influence 
of home builders—will continue to confer value on a home that is already pleasant. Clearly, a home 
that is constructed well will be less likely to develop problems going forward. Thus, to the extent 
that good weather contributes to good construction, it will have instrumental value indefinitely.  The 
point is that a home can only remain pleasant as long as ambient factors have cooperated with the 
causal influences of the persons behind design, construction, and maintenance, and, moreover, 
continue to do so.
13
 Now we can begin to appreciate why proponents of a JTB+ theory might be well-positioned 
to meet the challenge presented by the Secondary Value Problem. The ‘+’ in such theories, as we 
note, stands for some condition aimed at blocking Gettier cases. Gettier cases come in many 
flavours, but, all of them are cases in which a subject has a justified true belief, but, environmental 
conditions are unfavourable in some way.13 This idea is sometimes expressed by pointing out that 
Gettier cases involve an element of ‘bad epistemic luck’. We contend that these are cases in which 
beliefs lack the kind of instrumental e-value that is ordinarily conferred by ambient factors. Of 
course, Gettier cases also involve an element of ‘good epistemic luck’ that results in the belief’s 
being true, but we contend that this ‘good luck’ simply amounts to the conferral of the epistemic 
good of true belief without the conferral of instrumental e-value in any interesting way.14 In Gettier 
cases, ambient factors are not instrumental in the sense that they systematically facilitate getting the 
epistemic good of true rather than false belief; rather, the ambient factors just happen to be such that 
the epistemic good of true belief is gotten, albeit in a particularly unsystematic way.  
To see this, it is helpful to consider an ordinary case of knowing and a Gettier counterpart:
HAT: Bertie purchases a new and rather ridiculous hat that he puts in his 
closet. Later that day, Bertie believes that his hat is in the closet. Indeed, he 
knows so. 
HAT*: Bertie purchases a new and rather ridiculous hat that he puts in his 
closet. Later that day, Bertie believes that his hat is in the closet. Unbeknownst 
to Bertie, Jeeves has chosen today for his semi-annual cleaning out of Bertie’s 
closet, with the particular aim of ridding Bertie of articles of clothing that are 
unbecoming to an English gentleman. However, uncharacteristically, Jeeves 
misses the hat, which remains in the closet. So Bertie’s belief is justified and 
true, but not knowledge. 
14
13 We are using ‘Gettier cases’ here to refer to cases where knowledge is forestalled by epistemic luck. As Pritchard 
[2005] demonstrates, knowledge can be forestalled by epistemic luck both in cases of the sort Gettier [1963] offered, as 
well as in barn façade cases, where it is specifically environmental luck at play. What both have in common is that the 
target belief could have easily been false given the way the belief was formed. The ‘+’ component of knowledge is best 
understood assuring that an anti-luck condition is met.
14 The double-luck structure of Gettier cases is observed by, for instance, Zagzebski [1994].
We contend that the belief in HAT has more e-value than the belief in HAT*. The reason is that the 
belief in HAT* is vulnerable to revision despite being true [Williamson 2000: 61-64]. Bertie is at 
risk for giving up his true belief that the hat is in the closet if Jeeves apprises him of his cleaning 
activities. Of course, Bertie might retain his belief nonetheless due to wishful thinking. However, 
the retained belief would lack instrumental e-value due to relatively poorer belief-management. 
Holding fixed that the belief has this instrumental e-value due to good management, the 
environmental conditions in the Gettier case will work against Bertie’s sustaining the true belief. 
So, although ambient factors happen to be such that the epistemic good of true belief is gotten, they 
are not instrumental to any systematic persistence of this epistemic good. Systematic persistence, 
here, is persistence that does not require belief management to be poor in especially lucky ways. 
 As in the analogous case where the good is having a pleasant home, the conferral of 
instrumental e-value on a belief—both by factors due to the causal influence of psychological 
mechanisms of the believer at the personal and subpersonal level and by ambient factors—results 
from an important sense in which these two complement one another to secure the good in 
canonical cases.15 Good belief management is effective in securing the good of having (only) true 
beliefs in whatever kinds of circumstances can be taken as ordinary in the present case. However, 
favourable environmental conditions are similarly whatever circumstances are effective at 
facilitating this securing of the epistemic good when good belief management is undertaken. Thus, 
any instrumental e-value conferred either by the belief management or by environmental conditions 
stems from the possibility that causal influences from the believer and the surrounding environment 
might turn out to systematically secure the epistemic good of true rather than false belief by 
complementing one another in the canonical way.
 It is easy to ignore the instrumental e-value conferred by ambient factors. This kind of 
instrumental e-value arises as the product of a necessary division of labour between believers and 
15
15 Williamson [2000], ch. 2-3 highlights the importance of complementation.
environment in securing the epistemic good. By definition, there is little that believers can do to 
secure the instrumental e-value that must come from favourable environmental conditions; we 
rightly tend to focus on the kind of instrumental e-value we can do something about and hope for 
the best. However, that favourable environmental conditions are something we value on an 
epistemic dimension is implicit in the way that we expect good belief management to adjust 
methods of inquiry so as to bring about complementation when environmental conditions deviate 
from the ordinary. If Bertie becomes aware that Jeeves is considering cleaning out the closet, we 
would expect Bertie not to depend on his memory of putting his hat in the closet as a basis for 
believing that his hat is now in the closet. That way of managing the belief no longer has even the 
appearance of complementing the present environmental conditions, and so that way of managing 
the belief no longer appears good. Underlying this thought, however, is the presumption that 
complementary—that is to say favourable—environment conditions are worth having because of 
the way they facilitate securing the epistemic good of true belief. This presumption of value 
remains even when we are unable to do anything more to assure that methods of belief management 
and environmental condition will be complementary.
 We originally stated our position by saying that Gettierized beliefs lack a particular kind of 
instrumental e-value. We can restate our position in a positive way: a belief that is un-Gettierized is 
a belief that is formed and sustained under (difficult or even impossible to specify) favourable 
environmental conditions that confer a kind of instrumental e-value that is distinct from (but, 
complementary to) the kind of instrumental e-value conferred by the good management of that 
belief. It bears emphasizing (again) that believing truly is an ongoing state. For this reason, if a 
belief has some property that is incompatible with being in a Gettier case, that property could 
continue to confer instrumental e-value on an already true belief indefinitely. This indefinite 
instrumental e-value is borne out by the fact that, on the assumption that beliefs are managed well, 
favourable environmental conditions will tend to stabilize beliefs over time only if they are true.
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 We have shown how the property of being knowledge confers more e-value on a belief than 
the property of being justified and true due to the additional instrumental e-value conferred by 
favourable environmental conditions. It should be equally clear how the property of being 
knowledge confers more e-value on a belief than the property of being true and managed in 
favourable environmental conditions. If Bertie could know that he will avoid marrying Honoria (a 
wholly undesirable partner) by reasonably anticipating the clever assistance of Jeeves, but he 
merely irrationally believes it on the basis of his misplaced confidence in his own ability to deflect 
Honoria’s attentions, his belief has less instrumental e-value than it might have had. If Bertie does 
not come to appreciate his reasons for thinking that Jeeves will be able to extricate him from his 
troubles, Bertie is at risk of losing his true belief that he will avoid marrying Honoria once he is 
confronted forcefully with his own inadequacy.
Thus, the value of knowledge ordinarily exceeds the value of merely true belief, merely 
justified true belief, and merely true belief in favourable environmental conditions. Indeed, it 
appears that any component of knowledge will fall short when it comes either to conferring the kind 
of instrumental e-value that stems from good belief management or the kind that stems from 
favourable environmental conditions. Given that knowledge confers both kinds, knowledge will 
turn out to confer more instrumental e-value than any of its salient components.
One might worry that the Secondary Value Problem is not as easily resolvable by all JTB+ 
theories as we have suggested. For example, a JTB+ account according to which ‘+’ is a ‘no false 
lemmas’ condition (e.g. Clark [1963])16 fails to provide a ‘+’ condition that would confer the 
relevant epistemic value in some cases because a such a condition does not block, for example, barn 
façade cases (which are, arguably, ‘double-luck’ cases). However, this JTB+ account is 
unacceptable not so much because of the Secondary Value Problem, but rather because it isn’t 
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16 The ‘no false lemmas’ proposal identifies the ‘+’ condition as a condition one satisfies only if she does not reason 
through any false premise. 
materially adequate.17 Even ‘+’ conditions that don’t successfully serve as an anti-luck condition 
across the board nonetheless can be such that, when satisfied, confer additional e-value to ongoing 
true belief states in canonical cases. Clark’s ‘no false lemmas’ condition, for instance, can be used 
to show why Bertie’s belief in HAT is more e-valuable than his belief in HAT*.
Ultimately, it may be that the only viable JTB+ theory includes some precisely formulated 
modal safety condition as the ‘+’ condition.18 Alternatively, perhaps the only viable JTB+ theory 
takes knowledge as primitive, explaining ‘+’ as that component that fails to obtain when someone 
has a certain kind of JTB without knowing [Williamson 2000]. We need not adjudicate these 
disputes. We merely wish to point out that even a half-plausible JTB+ account has the resources to 
explain why JTB+ is more e-valuable than mere JTB in canonical cases. So much, then, for the 
Secondary Value Problem.
4. Another Value Problem?
 Pritchard [2009a] suggests that solving the Primary and Secondary Value Problems might 
not be enough to satisfactorily account for the value of knowledge. He claims that there might be a 
Tertiary Value Problem because knowledge must confer a distinctive sort of e-value—one different 
in kind rather than in degree. Otherwise, Pritchard argues, we cannot explain why knowledge is 
more worthy of study than alternatives that confer a marginally different degree of e-value. 
 We do not find this argument convincing. We doubt that the only way that knowledge could 
be worthy of study is due to its distinctive e-value. We further doubt that the only reason to be 
interested in knowledge is because of the e-value that it confers. Beliefs that are not defeasible and 
infallibly justified may be very e-valuable indeed. However, arguably, beliefs of this sort are so rare 
(if even possible) that they are of considerably less theoretical interest. By contrast, knowledge is 
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17 For counterexamples offered to Clark’s [1963] view, see Lycan [2006].
18 This is because, to a first approximation, a true belief is safe, by definition, if and only if it is not lucky. Cf. 
Pritchard’s [2007] (Safety) (p. 8) and (Lucky True Belief) (p. 3).
not only e-valuable, but, presumably, possible to obtain in many areas of inquiry that matter to us. 
For this reason, knowledge may be far more interesting from a theoretical perspective. Indeed, 
perhaps knowledge strikes the right balance between being e-valuable and being obtainable so as to 
be the epistemic commodity that is most interesting to us. Plausibly, there are still other features that 
make knowledge theoretically interesting.
Despite misgivings about the significance of the Tertiary Value Problem, it is worth 
considering how the picture developed in §§2-3 bears on the problem, such as it is. When compared 
to the e-value of its components, there is a sense in which knowledge does confer a distinctive kind 
of e-value; though there is a sense in which it may not. It may not have a distinctive kind of 
epistemic value in the sense that any particular kind of e-value that knowledge confers may well be 
had by one of its components. For instance, we are willing to concede, at least for the sake of 
argument, that the non-instrumental e-value knowledge confers may well just be the e-value of 
truth. However, the e-value of knowledge is distinctive in the sense that no particular one of its most 
salient components will confer every kind of e-value that ordinarily comes along with knowledge. 
A merely true belief, for instance, will not have the instrumental e-value that goes along with 
justification. Moreover, knowledge comes along with sufficient levels of both ‘J’ and ‘+’ kinds of 
instrumental e-value so as to ensure that the epistemic good of true belief is secured. This suggests 
that even if knowledge only marks a ‘stage in the in the continuum of epistemic value’ [Pritchard 
2009a: 4], it marks an important and non-arbitrary stage—one in which a reasonable division of 
epistemic labour between the believer and environment has shown its merits.
5. Conclusion
 Various putative value problems for knowledge have received attention in the recent 
literature. It has even been suggested that epistemology has taken a ‘value turn’ [Riggs 2008]. 
However, when we appreciate that beliefs are ongoing states, these value problems largely resolve 
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themselves. Indeed, our solution resembles the original Platonic suggestion that knowledge is 
valuable because knowledge is belief that is tied to the good of truth. Our discussion in §§2-3 
clarifies what being tied to truth amounts to, and what sorts of properties can confer that kind of 
instrumental value on an ongoing belief. 
 It is worth emphasizing that our solution is available to a wide class of theories. That, for 
example, virtue theories of knowledge may be able to satisfactorily account for the value of 
knowledge does not distinguish them from alternative JTB+ theories; virtue theories gain no 
competitive advantage from their ability to effectively address the Primary and Secondary Value 
Problems. Our principal point, then, is that the value of knowledge can be had on the cheap—
without taking on much in the way of substantive theoretical constraints.19 
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